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ABSTRACT
AN EERIE JUNLGE FILLED WITH DRAGONFLIES, SNIPER BULLETS AND
GHOSTS: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF VIETNAM AND THE
VIETNAMESE THROUGH THE EYES OF AMERICAN TROOPS
MAY 2015
MATTHEW MARTIN HERRERA,
B.A., HUMBOLDT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
DIRECTED BY: PROFESSOR CHRISTIAN APPY

This thesis examines the changing perceptions of Vietnam’s landscape and the
Vietnamese in the eyes of American troops throughout the Vietnam War. Throughout the
late 1950s and early 1960s, the Vietnamese were depicted as a people misguided by the
French and in need of political mobilization by the American media and government.
Following heavy investment and a rigged election in 1956, South Vietnam was painted as
a beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia and an example of what American aid is
capable of. As an increasing American military presence was being established in South
Vietnam in the early 1960s, American troops were reminded by pocket books and other
forms of American propaganda that South Vietnam was a land of dignity and respect. At
first, troops were shocked by the beauty of the landscape and recalled that Vietnam did
not look like a war-torn country at all. Yet as the land became increasingly devastated
due to defoliant and numerous bombings, the perceptions of the Vietnamese took a turn
for the worst; eventually being subhuman and deceptive. Vietnam’s landscape became
perceived as a land of death where youth was expendable. However, less than a decade
after the United States had pulled out of Vietnam, veterans and those affected by the war
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begin to return in mass numbers constituting the largest population of Americans in
Vietnam. This resulted in Vietnam’s landscape, which was seen as a land trap-laden
wasteland, being seen a place of healing with a beautiful people that Americans helped
save.
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INTRODUCTION
When American troops in large numbers first went to Vietnam in 1965, the land
was verdant and lush. The American government and the press depicted the Vietnamese
as a “rural” people who were in need of political “mobilization” and saving from a
communist enemy.1 Envisioned as child-like and innocent, they were clearly worthy of
American friendship. However, by the time Americans left in 1973, not only had the
once green landscape been reduced to a crater-ridden moonscape, but the people had
become untrustworthy and deceptive in the eyes of U.S. troops. Yet almost a decade
later, American veterans began to revisit what was once considered Shangri-La on earth,
constituting the largest population of U.S. citizens in Vietnam throughout eighties.
The changing perceptions of the Vietnamese landscape and people undermined
government attempts to continue the American presence in Vietnam. The changing
landscape also left lasting impressions on the memories of those who served. While most
served only one yearlong tour of duty, their experience with the landscape, as mediated
by race and ethnicity, affected their memories of the Vietnamese. As Vietnam
increasingly became a wasteland due to constant fighting, bombing, and defoliation, the
value of the Vietnamese in the eyes of American troops took a turn for the worse;
eventually leading to the Vietnamese being seen as subhuman. Americans, by the end,
saw the physical environment as of little value with neither people nor the land worth
saving. These perceptions also convinced those in the military and media that the State
of Vietnam was an unworthy ally and the Vietnamese army was not capable of winning
the war.

1

James R. Bullington and James D. Rosenthal, “The South Vietnamese Countryside: Non-Communist
Political Perceptions,” Asian Survey 10, no. 10 (August 1970): 651, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642804.
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To say there are a plethora of works on the Vietnam War is an understatement.
Many historians such as Marilyn Young, Lloyd Gardner, and Fredrik Logevall have
examined the various aspects of U.S. involvement and the years of active American
warfare.2 There is also much scholarship that examine the various phases of American
involvement in Vietnam, and the effects of it on American troops and those in the United
States.3 In addition to scholarly works on various aspects of American involvement,
there are large numbers of memoirs by those who participated in the war, some of the
most popular being A Rumor of War, We Were Soldiers Once…and Young, Chickenhawk,
and Fire in the Lake.4 Scholars such as Patrick Hagopian and Michael Allen have
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For works that analyze the events leading up to the American involvement and the consequences, see
George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986);
Gareth Porter, “Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered,” in The American
War in Vietnam, ed. Jayne Werner and David Hunt (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1993), 9-22;
Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1995); Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1996); George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and
Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002); Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and
the Pentagon Papers (New York: Penguin Books, 2003); Fredrik Logevall, “Lyndon Johnson and
Vietnam,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004) 100-12,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552566; Charles E. Neu, America’s Lost War, Vietnam: 1945-1975
(Wheeling Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2005); Francis Bator, “No Good Choices: LBJ and the Vietnam/Great
Society Connection,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 3 (June 2008): 326-70, doi 62509986; Mark Philip
Bradley, Vietnam at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Dwight Jon Zimmerman and Wayne
Vansant, The Vietnam War: A Graphic History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009).
3
For scholarly works on topics of American involvement see Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War:
The Media and Vietnam ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Grace Sevy, The American
Experience in Vietnam: A Reader (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989); Anthony Campagna,
The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War (New York: Praeger, 1991); Jayne Werner, The Vietnam
War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Jonathan Shay,
Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scribner, 1994);Ron
Steinman, Inside Television’s First War: A Saigon Journal (Columbia and London: University of Missouri
Press, 2002); Herman Graham, The Brothers’ Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the Military
Experience (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).
4
For memoirs and novels on the American side see Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1977); Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 1988); Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (New York: Broadway Books, 1990); James
Olson and Randy Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedfords/St. Martins, 1998);
David B. Simmons, Our Turn to Serve: An Army Veteran’s Memoir of the Vietnam War (Bloomington, IN:
Xlibris Corporation, 2011). For the Vietnamese side see:, Le Ly Hayslip, When Heaven and Earth Changed
Places (New York: Plume, 1990); Kiem Do and Julie Kane, Counterpart: A South Vietnamese Naval
Officer’s War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998); Ninh, The Sorrow of War: A Novel of
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published studies that combine the study of memory and Vietnam together.5 There are
even those that examine the role of gender and its effect on the decision making during
the war such as Robert Dean’s Imperial Brotherhood and is even mentioned in Heather
Marie Stur’s Beyond Combat.6 Even consumerism and soldiering in South Vietnam
during the war has been studied by Meredith Lair’s Armed with Abundance, and tourism
after the war such as Scott Laderman’s Tours of Vietnam.7
While these works all try to make sense of American participation in Vietnam,
none have combined the examinations of human senses and emotions with perceptions of
the Vietnamese landscape to examine how it affected perceptions of the Vietnamese.8

North Vietnam (New York: Riverhead Books, 1993); Dang Thuy Tram, Last Night I Dreamed of Peace,
trans. by Andrew X. Pham (New York: Harmony Books, 2007).
5
For works that combine the study of memory and Vietnam together see Fred Turner, Echoes of
Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory (New York: Anchor Books, 1996); Christian G. Appy,
Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides (New York: Viking, 2003); Michael Allen, Until
The Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (University of North Carolina
Press, 2009); Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the
Politics of Healing (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009).
6
Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1989); Sandra C. Taylor, Vietnamese Women at War: Fighting for Ho Chi Minh
and the Revolution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood:
Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001);
Pamela A. Pears, Remnants of Empire in Algeria and Vietnam: Women, Words, and War (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2004); Kara Dixon Vuic, Officer, Nurse, Woman The Army Nurse Corps in the Vietnam
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Heather Marie Stur, Beyond Combat: Women and
Gender in the Vietnam War Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
7
For works on tourism in Vietnam see Mary Hershberger, Traveling to Vietnam: American Peace
Activists and the War (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Joan C. Henderson, “War As a
Tourist Attraction: the Case of Vietnam,”.International Journal of Tourism Research 2, no. 4 (200): 269280; Victor Alneng, “What the Fuck Is a Vietnam?’: Touristic Phantasms and the Popcolonization of (the)
Vietnam (War),” Critique of Anthropology 22, no. 4 (2002): 461-489; Scott Laderman, Tours of Vietnam:
War, Travel Guides, and Memory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). For works on that examine
consumerism and economics during the war see Robert L. Sanson, The Economics of Insurgency in the
Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1970); Anthony S. Campagna, The Economic
Consequences of the Vietnam War (New York: Praeger, 1991); David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War:
Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003);
Meredith H. Lair, Armed with Abundance: Consumerism and Soldiering in the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill:
North Carolina Press: 2011).
8
For works on use sensory history see Andrew Preston, “Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the
Secular in the History of American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (November 2006):
783-812; Mark M. Smith, Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History
(Berkeley: UC California Press, 2007); Andrew J. Rotter, “Empires of the Senses: How Seeing, Hearing,
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According to Andrew Rotter in his article “Empire of the Senses,” “all human
relationships … are shaped by all five senses; how we understand others, even more how
we feel about them, emotionally, and thus how we act toward them, have a good deal to
do with how we apprehend them through every sense.”9 Additionally, none have
examined the relationship between the landscape and the memory of combat veterans;
particularly those who returned to Vietnam after the war had ended. By utilizing further
analysis and study, one can see how American perceptions of Vietnam and the
Vietnamese worsened as the countryside withered and dried up.

Smelling, Tasting, and Touching Shaped Imperial Encounters,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 1 (January
2011), 3-19: AN 56599927.
9
Rotter, “Empire of the Senses,” 4.

4

CHAPTER 1
A LAND SURPASSING FERTILITY
When French explorers and merchants landed on the shores of Vietnam, it
appeared they had come across a gold mine. During the Mekong Exploration
Commission, French surveyors realized the potential treasure they came across. The
Mekong Exploration Commission saw Southeast Asia “As a highway of commerce with
the markets of inland China, and as a slipway for extracting the minerals and forest
produce of the intervening lands.” Furthermore, this furnished an entry point “into
continental Asia” and redeemed “the fortunes of the struggling colony in Saigon and
endowing France with the potential for an eastern empire of its own.”10 In an 1886
article for Century, Augustine Heard described the land of Vietnam as rich and of
“surpassing fertility” due to being “abundantly watered by the great river Meikong,
which with its subsidiary streams traverses in every direction.”11 According to the
British magazine Spectator, Indochina was too good to be true:
Statesmen cannot be indifferent to the magnificence of the prize…It is more than
two-thirds the size of France, is accessible by three splendid rivers… and is
splendidly fertile almost throughout. The forests are full of teak, the mountains
overflow with minerals, and the plains, under the rudest culture, produce
everything cultivated in the tropics. The reservoirs of earth-oil rival those of
Pennsylvania, and there are large fields of coal.12

To the French, Vietnam resembled paradise, and was the perfect place for the
French to colonize. Not only was Vietnam in a prime location for opening up trade in the

10

John Keay, “The Mekong Exploration Commission , 1866 – 68: Anglo-French Rivalry in South East
Asia,” Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (November 2005): 290, DOI: 10.1080/03068370500276266.
11
Augustin Heard, “France and Indo-China,” Century 32, no. 3 (July 1886): 418,
http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=cent;cc=cent;rgn=full%20text;idno=cent00323;didno=cent0032-3;view=image;seq=428;node=cent0032-3%3A14;page=root;size=100.
12
Ibid, 420.
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Pacific, but the rich resources and fertile lands could only help increase the French
Empire’s income. Because the Vietnamese landscape was lush, green, and abundant with
natural resources, French politicians and officials jumped at the opportunity to colonize
the country and civilize its people. According to Alice Conklin, French “publicists, and
subsequently politicians, declared that their government alone among the Western states
had a special mission to civilize the indigenous peoples now coming under its control –
what the French called their mission civilsatrice.”13 As a result the French made large
investments in Indochina, opening up schools teaching the French curriculum and
establishing Vietnam as one of its main colonies.
The United States Department of Defense began to feel the same way as the
French did back in 1886 regarding the prosperity of the land and people. In 1962, the
Department of Defense published A Pocket Guide to Vietnam: 1962, which like the
French colonizers before them, saw Vietnam’s tropical plants and resources as having
great importance and economic potential:
Its [Vietnam’s] abundant rice crop, locally-grown vegetables, and fish from the
richly stoked seas at its door make the country largely self-sustaining in food. A
major export is rubber. Although the war ravaged the large rubber plantations and
some of this acreage has not been reclaimed, rubber is still a very important
product. Lacquer from Vietnam has always been highly prized on the foreign
market… Tea, coffee, and quinine are grown in the high plateaus, which also
produce cinnamon, timber, raw silk, vegetables, and vegetable dyes. Other
Vietnamese products are corn, sugar cane, copra, tobacco, and mint oil. 14
When engaging with the local inhabitants, U.S. servicemen and women were constantly
reminded by pocketbooks and their superiors that respect and manners were a large part
13

Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa,
1895-1930 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997) 1.
14
U.S. Department of Defense, A Pocket Guide to Vietnam: 1962 (Armed Forces Information and
Education: U.S. Department of Defense, 1962) 4. A Pocket Guide to Vietnam: 1962, was issued to United
States troops who were bound for Vietnam. The function of this book was to help educate US troops about
the country, people, and local customs
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of Vietnamese society: “Wherever you go, remember that Vietnam is a land of dignity
and reserve. Your good manners, thoughtfulness, and restrained behavior will be
appreciated by the Vietnamese.”15 By examining the actions taken by the United States,
one could conclude the Americans were looking to expand their imperial power.
However, this was not the case, and the ultimate goal of the United States was different
than the French. France looked to exploit the resources of Vietnam for economic gain
and establish a colonial relationship; the United States aimed to establish a new modern
capitalist state free from communist influence.
As the French - Indochina War raged on and American financial support for the
war surged, Americans took a critical view of the French. In 1951, Time magazine
reported that the French military was “dizzily off balance,” and the soldiers were “hiding
their heads in the sand.” French soldiers claimed the war was a lost cause, and South
Vietnamese citizens began to change “Viet Nam piasters into Ho Chi Minh’s currency.”
Both the French and Southern Vietnamese “agreed that Hanoi would be in Ho’s hands by
year’s end.”16 On the other hand, Americans depicted the Vietnamese as a people with
strong potential that were being misguided by the French. When the French first began to
train Vietnamese soldiers for conflict against the “Indo-China” rebels, the American
media praised their resiliency for keeping “their organization intact.” The media also
commended their courage and tenacity for being able to “kill several-hundred of the
enemy in close fighting” despite their defeat in an encounter with northern rebels.17 As
the United States invested more into Vietnam, more Americans began to take an interest
15

Ibid, 1
“Battle of Indo-China: Profound Change,” Time, 22 January 1951,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,888892,00.html#ixzz1t21SLHoL
17
“VIETNAMESE UNITS DISAPPOINT FRENCH: Fail to Exploit Advantages Against Indo-China,”
New York Times, 13 October 1953.
16

7

in Vietnamese culture and American propaganda painted the Vietnamese as a people
needing American guidance. A 1954 event held at the Carnegie Endowment
International Center, displayed Vietnamese culture and allowed patrons to witness crafts
never before seen in the United States. There was even a chance for visitors to sample
Vietnamese Cuisine.18
According to historian Robert Dean, American political leaders perceived South
Vietnam as “an idealized republican small producer democracy” throughout the early
1950s.19 The belief in the domino theory, prompted the United States to fund over
seventy-five percent of the France’s war expenditures as aid increased from 650 million
in 1953 to 1.28 billion dollars in 1954 alone.20 After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the
United States perceived Vietnam as a land of potential prosperity and modernity.
President Dwight Eisenhower made it clear to future South Vietnamese president Ngo
Dinh Diem, that the Vietnamese people would have full support of the American
government, going as far as to describe it as a humanitarian effort:
Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of
several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are
passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being
fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian
effort. We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to
be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of
the Government of Viet-Nam … I am, accordingly, instructing the American
Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of
Government, bow an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your
Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial.”21

18

“VIETNAMESE ARTS TO BE SHOWN HERE: Guests at Carnegie Center Dinner Tonight Will
Also Sample Country's Cooking,” New York Times, 26 June 1954.
19
Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001) 205.
20
General Hoang Van Thai, “Dien Bien Phu: Why and How?” in Vietnam Documents: American and
Vietnamese Views of the War ed. by George Katsiaficas, 16-7.
21
President Dwight E. Eisenhower, letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers of
Vietnam, October 23, 1954, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1954-eisenhower-vietnam1.html.
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Following the “election” of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955 and millions of dollars of
“humanitarian aid” in the late 1950s and early 1960s, South Vietnam seemed to be
flourishing in the eyes of American politicians and the media. South Vietnamese
President Ngo Dinh Diem was hailed in 1959 as a “tough little miracle man.”
Newsweek’s Ernest Lindley proclaimed that Diem was “one of the ablest free Asian
leaders” and Americans should “take pride in our support.”22 Two years later, one
American visitor noted that the stores and markets of Saigon were “filled with consumer
goods.” The visitor also claimed that “the streets are filled with new motor scooters and
expensive automobiles; and in the upper-income residential areas new and pretentious
housing is being built.”23 Health services became more accessible to the population with
the “expansion of health facilities” including hospitals being built and over 3,000 village
health stations being established. According to Secretary Dean Rusk in 1963, North
Vietnam was falling behind South Vietnam in industry, education, and overall standard of
living despite its advantages of being more developed:
Although North Viet-Nam inherited most of the industry of Viet-Nam, and
although its population is larger, it fell rapidly behind South Viet-Nam in food
production, the number of children in school, and in standards of living. While per
capita food production rose 20 percent in the South, it fell 10 percent in the
North.24

22

Ernest K. Lindley, “An Ally Worth Having,” Newsweek, 29 June 1959, 31
Milton C. Taylor, “South Vietnam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress,” Pacific Affairs 34, no. 3 (Autumn
1961): 248, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2753362.
24
Dean Rusk, Address Before the Economic Club of New York, at New York, 22 April 1963, “The
Stake in Viet-Nam,” Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1963 in The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition,
Vol. 2 p. 727, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/ps33.htm.
23

9

Upon arriving at Saigon in 1964, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. issued a
public statement that described Saigon as “a city full of color and fascination.”25 Lodge
further described the Vietnamese with respect, even comparing them to Americans:
We think of the Vietnamese people as embodying a very old civilization and thus
respecting all that pertains to learning and culture while, at the same time, taking
part with modern energy in the struggle of life. We recall in particular the words
of Doctor Dooley: “Americans never fail to like the Viet-Namese…It is
impossible not to respect their driving compulsion for freedom… You have
organized yourselves for war; you have reclaimed hamlet after hamlet from the
aggressor; you are coming to the day when your country will be at peace and will
stand as a beacon of hope to other nations, thus showing what a well thought out
plan, animated by courage and sacrifice can accomplish. In America there is
respect for culture and learning. There is also admiration for courage. Finally
we, like you, believe in the dignity of the individual and his desire to be free. We
believe also that to the aspirations of free men everywhere for a better life there is
no upper limit. Vietnamese and Americans, therefore, have much in common. 26
In 1961 President John F. Kennedy sent a letter to South Vietnamese President
Ngo Dinh Diem assuring him that the United States was “prepared to help the Republic
of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence” from communist
insurgency.27 According to historian Fredrick Logevall, “vast quantities of the best
American weapons, jet fighters, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers arrived,
along with thousands of additional military advisers.”28 An article in the New York Times
by Homer Bigart thought the various counter-insurgency operations by the United States
made it seem as if war was inevitable in this land of peace and serenity. Bigart reported
that by February 1962, “Nearly 5,000 United States military personnel are in South

25

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., “Statement to Make Upon Arrival in Saigon,” in “Position Papers” in
“Henry Cabot Lodge Papers Collection” Carton 36 of 67 at Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.
26
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Vietnam and more are pouring in.”29 A decade ago, Vietnam was in turmoil after being
mishandled by the French and their puppet emperor Bao Dai.
Contradictions and Second Guessing
It became increasingly evident that the United States was prepping for war, since
by the end of 1963, there were over 16,000 military advisers in Vietnam.30

Now under

the leadership of Diem, with U.S. financial and military support, Vietnam was headed in
the right direction and seemed as if a solution had been found. Additionally, the public
statements regarding respect for the Vietnamese and declarations of confidence in the
South Vietnamese government was propaganda as the actions taken by the United States
said otherwise. It was very apparent that the United States wanted to project an image of
South Vietnam as one with a modern democracy with a dignified people, that was worthy
of respect. Yet at this time, the Diem Regime was becoming increasingly dictatorial and
holding public executions for those that spoke out against the South Vietnamese
government.31 Rufus Phillips who worked for Edward Geary Lansdale’s team in
Vietnam during the late 1950s and returned again in 1962 as part of the Agency for
International Development, stated the United States “supported the creation and
development of a secret, elite political party called the Can Lao” and claimed “It was
almost a carbon copy of the Communist party as an organizational weapon.”32
Ngo Dinh Diem’s presidency was also becoming more and more like a
dictatorship. Ngo Vinh Long, who was raised in Vietnam recalled “Every time we went
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to the movies there was Diem’s picture and we had to stand up and sing.”33 Public
executions were common and people in the West denied it. Executions by guillotines
were advertised in many newspapers, which Diem controlled, published pictures of this.
Military outposts in the Vietnamese country displayed the heads of accused Communists
proudly and encouraged photos:
In 1959, when I went around with the map teams there were many military
outposts where they summarily chopped off the heads of people they thought
were Communists. They put the heads on stakes right in front of their outposts,
sometimes with two cigarettes up the nostrils. They even invited people to take
pictures of it. They were very proud of themselves. It was a really savage time.
It was like back to the Middle Ages.
Not only does this brutal display of force shatter the image of a peaceful and serene
people, but also makes the South Vietnamese government look barbaric and totalitarian;
not the modernized democracy that the United States was backing and pouring resources
into.
In addition to contradicting what the United States was hoping to accomplish in
South Vietnam by supporting the Diem regime, their actions towards the farmers spoke
even louder. Beginning in 1959 the rural populations of Vietnam were herded together
and put in “newly constructed villages” called “argovilles,” which eventually became
known as “strategic hamlets.”34 Ngo Vinh Long, who grew up in Vietnam before leaving
in 1964, recalled that these hamlets “created tremendous destruction to peasant life” and
were surrounded with “barbed-wire fences, moats, and spikes.” The U.S. would also
destroy their rice fields and farmlands with defoliants to prevent the NLF from making
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use of them and forcing peasants to begin anew.35 According to Long this “caused
tremendous dislocation, even starvation.”
Many Vietnamese were resistant to being removed from their land as it was all
they had. In fact, some returned back to them despite being in dangerous area since being
declared a free-fire zone. Phan Xuan Sinh, who was part of the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) recalled that one old couple kept returning their farmlands despite
being relocated to a strategic hamlet. When questioned why he kept returning the elderly
man replied, “All my ancestors are buried here and this is our land. We’re not going to
leave.”36 Sinh was shocked to hear this at first but then realized “the land was
unimaginably important to Vietnamese peasants. They were extremely poor and the land
was all they had, all they loved.” Despite the United States claiming they were looking
out for the Vietnamese’s best interest and treating them with respect, they were removing
them away from the lands they were tied to and destroying it.
In addition to forced relocation from their homelands, the conditions in strategic
hamlets were appalling. When visiting the Ka Rom hamlet, Ngo Vinh Long recalled that
“two hundred people had starved to death” in a month’s time. The health of the
inhabitants were also in atrocious condition as “Their hair was crinkled and brown, their
skin was dark and flaky, and they smelled horrible.”37 When inquired about this, the U.S
embassy and Saigon government refused to do anything, responding “this is how we are
going to defeat the Communists,” and South Vietnamese propaganda brushed it aside,
claiming it was a “sickness from heaven.”38
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Back in the United States, they was a growing number of officials were skeptical
about getting too involved in Vietnam, and worried that the United States was stepping
into quicksand. For example, ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith
was uncomfortable with the idea of getting too involved in the “New Frontier,” and urged
President Kennedy to not send combat units or deepen involvement in Vietnam for fear
of the United States “being sunk under the rice fields.”39 In 1962, Galbraith sent a
memorandum to President Kennedy about his concerns in Vietnam and mentioned the
following considerations:
1. We have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into
a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement.
2. We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a
leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return.
3. There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force
in the area and bleed as the French did.
4. The political effects of some of the measures which pacification requires or is
believed to require, including the concentration of population, relocation of
villages, and the burning of old villages, may be damaging to those and
especially to Westerners associated with it.
5. We fear that at some point in the involvement there will be a major political
outburst about the new Korea and the new war into which the Democrats as so
often before have precipitated us.
6. It seems at least possible that the Soviets are not particularly desirous of
trouble in this part of the world and that our military reaction with the need to
fall back on Chinese protection may be causing concern in Hanoi.40

According to analyst Daniel Ellsberg, the sentiments Galbraith felt were similar to what
most Americans came to believe regarding the actions taken in Indochina: “For a great
many, perhaps most Americans, visions of ‘quagmire…morass…quicksand…bog,’ along
with the notion of ‘stumbling in’ have come to dominate their perceptions of America’s
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position in the ‘Second Indochina War.”41 Even Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
believed “[i]n South Vietnam, the U.S. had stumbled into a bog” and warned that
Americans “would be mired down there a long time.”
In the early 1960s, there were a number of memorandum and research reports on
the situation in Vietnam. While these reports highlighted positive feedback from the
American military aid, almost all of them confirmed the fear of a long, drawn-out conflict
being inevitable. In December of 1962, Roger Hilsman’s Research Memorandum argued
that despite American military support and tactics being successful, the Viet Cong were
not losing momentum:
[T]he Viet Cong has had to modify its tactics and perhaps set back its timetable.
But the ‘national liberation war’ has not abated nor has the Viet Cong been
weakened. On the contrary, the Viet Cong has expanded the size and enhanced
the capability and organization of its guerrilla force--now estimated at about
23,000 in elite fighting personnel, plus some 100,000 irregulars and sympathizers.
It still controls about 20 percent of the villages and about 9 percent of the rural
population, and has varying degrees of influence among an additional 47 percent
of the villages. Viet Cong control and communication lines to the peasant have
not been seriously weakened and the guerrillas have thus been able to maintain
good intelligence and a high degree of initiative, mobility, and striking power.
Viet Cong influence has almost certainly improved in urban areas not only
through subversion and terrorism but also because of its propaganda appeal to the
increasingly frustrated non-Communist anti-Diem elements.42
Fears of being trapped in a Vietnamese “bog” were confirmed in Hilsman’s report when
it confirmed that the Viet Cong were preparing “for a long struggle” and taking measures
“to maintain the present pace and diversity of its insurgent-subversive effort” against
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American intervention.43 He also claimed that the Viet Cong have only grown stronger
in their military might and become even more organized:
Viet Cong capabilities have increased considerably during the past three years. In
1959 a relatively small but effective military-political apparatus operating largely
in the Mekong River delta provinces, the Viet Cong has since grown into a
formidable force operating throughout the countryside and even in many urban
centers, including Saigon, the capital. In addition to increasing its numerical
strength, the Viet Cong has significantly improved its military and political
organization and its tactical, weapons, and subversive capabilities.44
Not only did this report show that the Viet Cong was growing stronger and preparing for
a long conflict, but they were doing so despite and because of the increase of American
support and growing aggressiveness of the South Vietnamese forces.
A few months later in February 1963, additional reports confirmed the belief that
the United States had stepped into quicksand despite some positive observations. In his
memorandum to President Kennedy, Michael Forrestal claimed “The war in South
Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago.” Forrestal also reported, that the
Viet Cong were more restricted in their movements and had trouble sustaining
themselves:
The Viet Cong, in sum, are being hurt – they have somewhat less freedom of
movement than they had a year ago, they apparently suffer acutely from lack of
medicines, and in some very isolated areas they seem to be having trouble getting
food.45

American aid programs and the influx of military support had given “the Vietnamese
military new confidence” and an increase in their assertiveness when engaging opposing
forces. Infiltration and acquiring supplies from South Vietnam through sea and had also
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been successfully blocked.46 However, the Viet Cong continued to flourish and recruit
large numbers. Forrestal’s memorandum reported that the Viet Cong continued
“to be aggressive and … extremely effective.” Since the start of 1963, Viet Cong forces
“fought stubbornly and with telling results at Ap Bac, near My Tho” and showed their
cunning by being able to escape “an elaborate trap in Tay Ninh province.” His
memorandum continued to describe various examples of the Viet Cong’s resilience citing
that there were able to fight “their way inside the perimeter of a U.S. Special Forces
training camp at Plei Mrong, killing 39 of the trainee defenders and capturing 114
weapons” and “completely overran a strategic hamlet in Phu Yen province that was
defended by a civil guard company in addition to the village militia.”47 All of this
information led Forrestal to conclude that he was unsure that the United States was even
winning, and that the United States had stepped into quicksand:
Our overall judgment, in sum, is that we are probably winning, but certainly more
slowly than we had hoped. At the rate it is now going the war will last longer than
we would like, cost more in terms of both lives and money than we anticipated,
and prolong the period in which a sudden and dramatic event could upset the
gains already made.48

Nonetheless, President Kennedy stood his ground and defended the American policy in
Indochina. At various speeches around the country, Kennedy justified the aid and
expenditures being poured into Vietnam by citing national interest and preventing the
spread of Communism:
I don’t see how we are going to be able, unless we are going to pull out of
Southeast Asia and turn it over to the Communists, how we are going to be able to
reduce very much our economic programs and military programs in South VietNam, in Cambodia, in Thailand.
46
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I think that unless you want to withdraw from the field and decide that it is
in the national interest to permit that area to collapse, I would think that it would
be impossible to substantially change it particularly, as we are in a very intensive
struggle in those areas.
So I think we ought to judge the economic burden it places upon us as
opposed to having the Communists control all of Southeast Asia with the
inevitable effect that this would have on the security of India and, therefore, really
begin to run perhaps all the way toward the Middle East. So I think that while we
would all like to lighten the burden, I don't see any real prospect of the burden
being lightened for the U.S. in Southeast Asia in the next year if we are going to
do the job and meet what I think are very clear national needs.49

Not only were these reports foretelling of what awaited the United States military, but
also similar to what French journalists described during the Indochina War, calling it a
“bog.” Lucien Bodard even later published a book on the Indochina War calling it The
Quicksand War: Prelude to Vietnam.50
Tensions Rising
As the pro-Catholic Diem Regime became more oppressive towards practioners
of Buddhism in South Vietnam, Buddhist monks rebelled. Known for their modest and
pacifist nature, the Buddhist monks mounted a protest movement that not only shocked
the South Vietnamese government, but also American intelligence services in 1963.
Under former Chief of State Bao Dai, Buddhists were able to practice their religion
openly without fear of persecution. When Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic, came into power,
the United States circulated propaganda throughout North Vietnam that the Virgin Mary
had returned to the South. Tensions between the Buddhists and the Diem regime
reached a boiling point on the Buddha’s birthday of that year when Buddhists mounted a
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massive protest in Hue against Diem’s ban on flying the Buddhist flag.51 The Diem
regime responded by sending government troops who inadvertently fired into the crowds
gathered. A number of Buddhists were killed in Hue, which led to additional protests
that drew larger numbers. The Buddhists accused the South Vietnamese government of
religious persecution –the South Vietnamese President denied the accusation and claimed
the Viet Cong were behind the protests.52 As various demonstrations, protests, and
hunger strikes attracted larger gatherings, the media coverage of the Buddhists in South
Vietnam surged. This led to the American government growing increasingly
apprehensive by the possible fall-out due to Diem’s actions.
Tensions between the Buddhists and South Vietnamese government fuliminated
on June 11, 1963. “Buddhist leadership tipped foreign correspondents” to gain publicity
for their next demonstration.53 According to journalist Malcolm Browne, the
forthcoming demonstration had more Buddhist monks and nuns than he had ever seen
before. The women preparing and serving tea to on lookers wore white mourning dresses
--some shedding tears. Joss sticks were lit, and a chant, described as “hypnotic,” began
quietly, slowing becoming louder at an increased tempo.54 When the chanting stopped, a
procession of monks and nuns moved to the intersection of Phan Dinh Phung and Le Van
Duyet, where a car was waiting with three monks inside.
The first monks out of the car were young, bringing out a cushion and placing it
in the middle of the intersection. As the monks made their way to the middle of the
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intersection, they aided an old monk, Thich Quang Duc, to the cushion. Positioning
himself on the cushion, Duc sat in the lotus position, and one of the young monks poured
gasoline all over him. After the young monks stepped back, Duc pulled out a box of
matches, ignited one, and dropped it into his lap setting himself ablaze. Never flinching
or crying out in pain, Duc remained in his position.55 Fire crews attempted to reach Duc,
but his fellow monks held them back. When a fire truck made an effort to break through,
a group of monks laid down in front of the wheels to impede its progress. As larger
crowds gathered to see what was going on, the smell of burning human flesh filled the
air. Photographers scrambled to take photos of what was going on, and others stood in
shock of what they were witnessing. After sustaining his position for a number of
minutes, Duc fell over in state of rigor mortis. With his body fully intact and unable to fit
in a coffin, the monks placed him on top of a coffin and paraded him to the Xa-Loi
pagoda. There the monks placed his body was on display for a number of hours before
being cremated. Duc’s heart however, was removed and kept as a symbol of their
insurrection.56 Images of Duc’s self-immolation “became front-page news around the
world and, in many cases for the first time, readers began to wonder what was happening
in Vietnam.”57
According to a government document entitled, History of the Vietnam War, 19621964: U.S. Policy 1962-1964 (Planned Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces), the United
States felt that this protest was only the beginning, as opposition to the Diem government
began to turn violent:

55

Ibid, 68-9.
Ibid.
57
Grace Sevy, The American Experience in Vietnam: A Reader (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989) 112.
56

20

A series of incidents beginning early in May revealed the deep Divisions between
militant Buddhist factions who purported to speak for the bulk of the South
Vietnamese population, and the Government. Lack of popular support for the
Diem regime had now turned to open opposition. As passions flared and Buddhist
activism was met with increasingly severe countermeasures, violence grew and
grew more serious. The U.S. began to be apprehensive about the possible
consequences of the Diem government falling as the result of a coup. By early
July, the crisis was recognized as serious at the highest levels of the U.S.
government.58

This was only the beginning of problems for the United States and Diem regime. After
the immolation took place, other resistance occurred. Frances Fitzgerald called the
Buddhist resistance a “call to rebellion.”59 In his book, America’s Longest War: The
United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, George Herring writes the “disaffected urban
population of South Vietnam responded.” According to Herring, “Students in the
universities and high schools, including some Catholics, joined in the mass protests, and
discontent quickly spread to the army.”60 The fire of anger and resentment towards the
government of South Vietnam only grew bigger as Madame Nhu, Diem’s sister-in-law,
called the immolations “barbeques,” and offered additional gasoline and matches.61 As
news and coverage of these incidents hit the Unites States, many Americans for the first
time began to wonder what was going on in Vietnam. In 1965, after the Presidential
election, Lyndon Johnson committed to a major escalation of U.S. troops in South
Vietnam.

58

History of the Vietnam War, 1962-1964: U.S. Policy 1962-1964 (Planned Phased Withdrawal of
U.S. Forces) 16-7, Folder 02, Box 01, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 01 - Assessment and Strategy, The
Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, accessed 25 March 2014,
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2120102004.
59
Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1972) 134.
60
Herring, America’s Longest War, 115.
61
Memorandum of conversation between Madame Nhu and Robert Manning, 24 June 1963 in Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 3, Vietnam, 500-501.

21

CHAPTER 2
SWALLOWED BY PARADISE…SPIT OUT BY WAR
As American combat troops in large numbers began to first set foot in Vietnam
during 1965, the land did not look war torn at all despite the years of constant fighting.62
In fact, former infantry officer Philip Caputo recalled being shocked by what he saw
when he first arrived at a camp outside of Da Nang. The difference between what Caputo
was told by his skipper back in Okinawa, Japan and what the countryside looked like left
him flabbergasted: “Vietnam, from what I could see of it, did not look like a war-torn
country. The ‘Communist stronghold’ in front of us reminded me of a tropical park.
Groves of bamboo and coconut palms rose out of rice paddies like islands from a colored
sea.”63 Similarly, Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore remembered the Central
Highlands of Vietnam was “a beautiful region; from the heavily populated coastal areas
with their white sandy beaches and flat rice paddies.”64 With the beautiful landscape and
leafy bright vegetation, Vietnam was what the 1962 U.S. Department of Defense pocket
guide made it seem: “a land of dignity and reserve.”65 In an interview years after the war,
Private Mark Smith recalled that the Binh Dinh Province looked as if it was “a Chinese
silk-screen print come to life” with mountain ranges rising out of nowhere.66
When soldiers saw the land for the first time, it often shattered the image
imprinted in their minds from their training. Many troops came in with the mentality that
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“red hordes” of Communist troops would be scattered all over the countryside. When
Caputo further reflected on the “tropical park,” he noticed that the only physical
manifestation of war in Vietnam was what the Americans had brought themselves. In his
personal account, he states “I scanned the countryside with my binoculars, looking for
red hordes, but the only signs of war were our own Phantoms, roaring northward with
their bomb racks full.”67 Due to technological advancements made during the Cold War,
the United States brought modern warfare to the countryside, utilizing helicopters,
bombers, and new machines of war to their advantage. In an interview, Private Mark
Smith recalled “one of the things that struck me first upon arriving in Vietnam, was that it
was the most beautiful country I have ever seen, and the one aspect of it that stuck with
me the most, is the intensity of the colors, is the greens… they almost vibrated they were
that intense.”68 In the eyes of the American soldiers, they were at war in a beautiful
country, not one that was covered in chaos, destruction, or Communist hordes.
The notion that Vietnam was a beautiful country with a respectable, innocent
people was overwhelmingly popular among the troops when they first landed. However,
this would not last forever. In summer of 1965, Lieutenant General Moore took a tour of
the “beautiful region,” and visited what had been a major battle ground between the
French and Vietnamese. At this site he learned that despite being in a country which
resembled tranquility and peace, American troops should never underestimate the foe
they were in combat against:
We walked the battleground, where a bullet-pocked six foot-high stone obelisk
declares in French and Vietnamese: ‘here on June 24, 1954, soldiers of France
and Vietnam died for their countries…’ Plumely and I walked the battleground
67
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for two hours. Bone fragments, parts of weapons and vehicles, webgear and shell
fragments and casings still littered the ground. From that visit I took away one
lesson: Death is the price you pay for underestimating this tenacious enemy.69

This was a sobering observation made by Moore. But, the first soldiers who came to
Vietnam in 1965 felt that the Vietnamese who lived in the countryside were not the
enemy. Rather than Communist pawns, they were seen as a peaceful people who kept to
themselves. The Department of Defense’s A Pocket Guide to Vietnam: 1962, described
these Vietnamese as a people who pledged no allegiance to the Viet Cong or South
Vietnamese government. Instead their main concern was tending to their farm, families,
and religion,
These people –the villagers, the rice farmers, the rubber plantation workers –have
had little feelings of identification with either the Viet Cong or the central
Government. The Vietnamese farmer lives in a small world limited by the
bamboo hedge around his village. His loyalties are to his family, his land, and his
spiritual world. 70
The Department of Defense’s description of the Vietnamese farmers also stated that they
have been harassed by the Viet Cong and their future was in jeopardy: “The Viet Cong
have neutralized the people’s support for the Government in some rural areas by a
combination of terror and political action. One of the continuing programs of the central
Government has been to provide better security and living conditions…the Communists
seek to destroy…their Government.”71 Should the communists have taken over the
southern half of Vietnam, farmers would be forced to give up their land and participate in
collectivization, establishing a face for whom the American troops were defending.
Contradictory to this however, as mentioned earlier, was 1962, the United States was
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forcing Vietnamese farmers off their land into strategic hamlets, destroying their fields,
and turning them into free-fire zones.
In addition to having to fight on multiple fronts against the enemy, one of the
greatest challenges for the American combatant would be trekking through Vietnam’s
terrain. While troops received training in tropical areas and were educated on
interactions in Vietnam, they were not prepared for the complexity of the situation
regarding the local inhabitants or the nature surrounding them. Photographs show that
the vegetation of Vietnam in the early 1960s was very thick and unmanaged. It was
common for troops to encounter grass that was waist high, which slowed movement
greatly. Also, troops would have to venture into thickly forested areas, sometime so thick
that the sun would be blocked out from hitting the floor.72 All of these factors took a
heavy toll on advancing troops, and by as early as June in 1965, the nature of Vietnam
began to be described as “a flat, eerie jungle, thick with scrub trees and tall grass, hot and
wet in intermittent rain, strong tropical sun” with the air being filled with “dragonflies
and sniper bullets.”73 The thick jungles and forested areas of Vietnam changed the way
American soldiers fought. Bayonets, thought to have been useful for close quarters
combat, were practically ineffective. The New York Times published an article in 1965 in
which U.S. troops replaced their bayonets “after a savage encounter that resembled
Indian fighting on the early American frontier.” The article further states that troops
claimed that “In a jungle war…bayonets are unwieldy.” American troops found more
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success wielding items such as hatchets or machetes to cut through the vegetation.74 This
early observation by the New York Times concludes that the fighting in the jungles of
Vietnam was different than that of any other war encountered by American troops. The
bayonet, one of the standard weapons that American troops had relied on since the
Revolutionary War, was now made obsolete due to the harsh terrain of Vietnam.75
In January 1965, the U.S. government painted the Vietnam’s landscape in a
positive light, and soldiers’ memoirs seemed to agree. But by mid-year, troops were
beginning to hate the land as the shock of beauty wore off. Philip Caputo recalled that
while the land was still beautiful, it was deadly: “most impressive was the view,
especially when you looked westward. Happy Valley was as beautiful as it was
dangerous, a quilt of emerald rice paddies and dusty fields broken by the vagrant lines of
paddy dikes and palm groves where the villages were.” In his personal account, he
proclaimed he “had never seen such a country, so lush and enchanting in the daytime that
it reminded me of Shangri-La, that fictional land of eternal youth. But night always
brought the sound of artillery, a practical reminder that this was Vietnam, where youth
was merely expendable.”76 The psychological impact of the deafening noise produced by
America’s own arsenal may have had a large impact on the way servicemen and women
saw the Vietnamese, and the enemy produced even more terrifying noises. At night, U.S.
troops listened for yelling which signaled Vietnamese soldiers charging their positions.
Vietnam appeared in memoirs as a treacherous place filled with dangerous landmines,
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muddy swaps that slowed progress, and trap-laden jungles waiting for troops to walk
through.77 In fact, Taylor E. Wise in, Eleven Bravo: A Skytrooper’s Memoir of War in
Vietnam, recalled that grunts “lived to escape the jungle, which was the grunts prison.”78
Photographs of the land reveal that sometimes troops would be forced down a narrow
path covered with vegetation giving the impression that soldiers were imprisoned. Figure
1 of the Appendix, while taken in 1969, perfectly illustrates this. American troops are
walking through an area thick with vegetation on each side, and the swamp water is up to
their mid-thigh. The vegetation is also slanting over their heads, holding them in and
restricting their movement greatly. The water is also muddy and unclear, preventing
them from seeing if there are any traps at the bottom. On either side there is no escape;
they have no choice but to remain partially submerged and continue forward as they carry
their wounded comrade.79
Not only did the jungles of Vietnam provide cover for the Viet Cong, but they
also were rigged with barb, traps, and explosives which impeded troop progress. While
in the jungles of Vietnam, trooper Jimmy Bass was amazed with how much he could
hear, and how little he could see as he referred to the “stupid jungles.”80 In fact, the thick
vegetation and tall grasses would greatly slow down troop progress. This was vital for
exfiltration, especially when moving out wounded soldiers in combat situations. Also
when it was required for helicopters to land, they would need a clear and open area which
could be troublesome to find, especially when the troops were engaged in thick jungle
77
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warfare. In Figure 2 in the Appendix, one can see how tall and thick the grass was. It is
above their knees in some cases and requires high steps to maneuver through it properly.
It should also be pointed out that the troops are headed to a helicopter for EVAC, and the
rotors are causing the grass to be blown. Had there been no wind coming from the
helicopter, the grass would be even higher, going up to perhaps the troops’ waistlines.
Furthermore this image also shows that the trees and tree line looked very similar to what
people could find in a park or heavily forested area back in the United States. This
photograph shows how thick the surrounding vegetation was as well. In looking at the
trees, it becomes very difficult to see past them showing how enemy troops could easily
be hiding among the vegetation.81
F.D. Newman described trekking through the jungles as “tiresome and harsh.”82
According to one account, troops endured trekking through severe terrains using
machetes to handle vegetation, and dealt with “leeches suck[ing] at you,” as “Branches
whip into your face.” Often the vegetation was so dense and thick, it was difficult to
pinpoint where fire was coming from: “The slick green foliage ahead offered no clue as
to where the fire had come from.”83 As a result, artillery and bombing strikes on heavily
forested areas would play a huge role in the war. According to Barry Weisberg in
Ecocide in Indochina: The Ecology of War, the Associated Press reported that the United
States dropped 2,825,824 tons of explosives on Vietnam by September of 1968. This
was “twice the tonnage dropped on all of Europe during World War II. The amounts to
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nearly 180 pounds of explosives for every person in North and South Vietnam as well as
upward of 20 tons of explosives for each square mile.”84 According to George Black, the
“U.S. Air Force dropped 100,000 tons of bombs on the surrounding mountains, stripped
the forests bare with Agent Orange and incinerated them with napalm,” in operations to
defend of Khe Sanh alone.85 In addition to the immense bombings, there was also a
massive amount of herbicides dropped all over South Vietnam. Black writes that
“Between 1961 and 1971, about 20 million gallons of herbicides were dropped on South
Vietnam.” Not only was this disastrous to the landscape and farmlands that the
Vietnamese were tied to, but also had lingering effects that exposed “as many as 4.8
million people to [the] toxic chemicals” in the decades after the war.86
According to a 1967 special report from the Japanese newspaper Asahi, scorched
earth tactics was a large part of the American strategy in the country side, particularly
with farmlands and hamlets. This report states that it was standard operating procedure
“to pound the place with bombs and shells with unreserved thoroughness before infantry
men move in.” Journalist Katsuichi Honda described that “by the time ground troops”
arrived, the “hamlets [were] almost wiped out.”87 Honda further describes that
Nearly 70% of the houses were burnt down, and some of them were still sending
up smoke. Here and there along the road, there were pitfalls. Sharpened bamboo
sticks were planted in the bottom of the holes. Most of these pitfalls were not
covered. It may be that the suddenness of the attack did not allow them time to do
so. All of the peasants seemed to have evacuated, and there was not a figure to be
seen. Judging from the yards surrounded by trimmed hedges and amply planted
with fruit trees, it seemed that the hamlet had been comparatively well-to-do.88
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The report also states that majority of the fields at this hamlet were ready for harvesting
rice, but large portions of it were destroyed by the artillery fire in an effort to secure the
area before confiscating the rice. This was to done ‘before the Viet Cong should get hold
of the rice’ harvested by the villagers.”89
After continuous heavy amounts of bombing and artillery strikes, “all that jungle
green became as monotonous as the beige of the desert or the white of the Arctic.”90 The
goal of destroying Vietnam’s landscape was not only to take away cover for the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army, but also to demoralize the people into submission.
According to Major Vernon Gillespie, “American strategists planned to use firepower to
break the will of the enemy.”91 As mentioned earlier, the Vietnamese were very tied to
land; especially the farmers. By destroying the land, American strategists hoped the will
of the Communist forces would eventually subside and surrender. This led to the
massive destruction of ground cover, eliminating any possible areas of hiding; especially
the heavy jungle areas. With massive bombs and raging fires of napalm engulfing heavy
jungle areas, often times there would be little to no vegetation left. This made it much
easier for combatants to spot mines and other traps as their area of vision was
substantially improved. Gillespie later reflected that because of “awesome firepower,”
the thick forested jungles and lands of Vietnam “really looked like the moonscape when
we were through.”92 Jimmy Bass recalled that when he flew over Vietnam, that the once
rich, lush, and green landscape was being decimated: “Looking at the countryside, [there
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were] bomb craters, land craters everywhere… the land was covered in bomb craters.”93
One photograph taken by Larry Burrows of Life magazine shows that after an artillery
strike and bombing run, the land resembled something similar to a desert. There was
hardly any greenery, save for a few strands of elephant grass. The landscape has turned
yellow, brown, and black in some places. Some of it is on fire and a significant part of
the land is smoldering. Behind the troops, the once green and lush environment full of
tall grasses and thick vegetation has been replaced by ash, dirt, and a smoking landscape.
When comparing this to the image from 1966, one can see that the land looks nothing
like it did a few short years ago.94 In addition to the land becoming a moonscape, it was
also tainted by the defoliants and herbicides, rendering the land unusable. Also, “Ten
percent of the munitions that rained down” did not detonate and remained in the land as
unexploded ordnance.95 Not only did this cause problems for the farmers, but also turned
their own fields into death traps. It has been estimated that “about 40,000 have been
killed by unexploded ordnance since the war’s end, with another 65,000 maimed.”96
Because the jungles and surrounding areas were heavily laden with traps,
explosives, and landmines, how the United States combatants viewed the local
Vietnamese people took a turn for the worse. As troops began to be killed as a result of
the ambushes and traps, they needed someone to point the finger at: and that would be the
local inhabitants. According to Private Bill Ehrhart, troops started to become suspicious
of the farmers whom they were supposed to protect. In an interview, he claimed that as
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people started to perish as a result of landmines, suspicions led to those tending the land
as they would never flinch after an explosion; almost as if they knew what was going to
happen: “After people are dying and getting hit by mines, and you see the locals never
get hit by mines or stepping on them, you start to think maybe they are the enemy, maybe
they are avoiding where all the landmines are.”97 Ehrhart later confessed that troops
began to fire upon suspicious people before asking questions (often times including
groups of innocent women and children): “These are the same people…the ARVN
(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and VC (Viet Cong) are the same people, the same
race…I started to wonder why is this? You begin to start to think they are all the
enemy…you begin to shoot first ask questions later.”98 This was very similar to
racialization and dehumanization of the Japanese during World War II. The Japanese
were perceived as “demons, savages, subhumans, and beasts.” During the Pacific
Campaign, troops were ordered to “Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs.” In a letter to his
wife, General Joseph Stilwell described the Japanese as “cockroaches” and was graphic
about his feelings towards them: “When I think of how these bowlegged cockroaches
have ruined our calm lives it makes me want to wrap Jap guts around every lamppost in
Asia.”99
As Vietnam’s landscape was being decimated and combatant opinions of the
Vietnamese took a dive, so did the American public towards the war effort. Various
stories, news reels and images of the war revealed that the American mission to save
Vietnam was hypocritical and destructive. Special reports by Life, Time, and the New
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York Times that inform the public of the operations going on in Vietnam, caused many to
see that the United States was not saving the Vietnamese or preserving a democracy at
all. One article in particular from New York Times in 1967 was very critical of the policy
makers and their decisions regarding the Vietnam War and accused them of backing up a
dictatorial regime: “Our policy makers have distorted history to justify our intervention in
a civil conflict to supposedly defend a free nation against external aggression; actually we
are backing a dictatorial group in Saigon against a competing group backed by a
dictatorial group in the north.”100 As a result of other news reports and images that
expose the reality of the war, Americans begin to realize that this “humanitarian
mission,” as coined by President Eisenhower, was the exact opposite. Instead, the same
people who the United States promised to protect were being punished and treated as
guilty until proven innocent.
In 1968, anti-war sentiment grew during with the Tet Offensive. Occurring
between January and February, the Tet Offensive hit every major city and command
center in South Vietnam, and had been the largest strategic operation taken by any side
during the war. While this may not have been a strategic victory for the communist
forces, this was a moral victory for them. After witnessing the horrors of Tet Offensive
first hand, Chuck Searcy recalled that he began to question the mission the United States
had taken in Vietnam: “It didn’t take long to see that what I’d been told about America’s
role in the war was distortions, exaggerations and lies…Although ‘lies’ implies malice.
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Like so many things Americans do, we had good intentions, but I saw very quickly that
they had gone awry.”101
The images that arose out of this attack were powerful making it into magazines
such as Life and Time. One particular image captured by John Olson captures the
devastation of Vietnam.102 Behind the troops, there are remnants of what may have been
a village. The American soldier leading the unit has his clothes torn and by the looks on
his fellow troops, they have seen much combat. Surrounding them is nothing but rubble.
The trees and landscape have been completely destroyed and it is hard to tell if what is
left is one building or several as nothing is left untouched by the attack. Furthermore, the
expression on the faces of the troops is that of fear and concern; they have no idea what is
lying in front of them or what they will encounter next. The only one who looks to be
holding on to his composure strongly is the one yelling out orders. This powerful image
captures the intensity that was the Tet Offensive, and showed Americans the cost and
deadliness of the war. Furthermore, this another distinctive aspect of the Tet Offensive is
the destruction of towns and urban landscapes that occur in the attack.103
A Contaminating Experience
As the public became increasingly divided on the war, the American troop’s
resentment towards the Vietnamese increased. Soon many US troops began to see the
Vietnamese as subhuman, and as it becomes more apparent that their job is centered on
the killing of Vietnamese rather than claiming territory or protecting citizens, wartime
atrocities occur more frequently. In his personal account of combat experience, Bill
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Ehrhart viewed Vietnamese people as subhuman and foreign from anything he ever
encountered when he first arrived in Vietnam. In particular, it was the smell that
overpowered him:
The first thing that struck me about Vietnam was the smell: a sharp, pungent odor
compounded of cooking fires, fish sauce, rice fields fertilized with human and
animal excrement, water buffalo, chickens, unwashed bodies, and I don’t know
what all else, but it clawed violently at my nose and caught fire it my lungs. It
was awful. It permeated everything.104
According to historian Christian Appy, American troops described the air in Vietnam as
rushing in “like poison, hot and choking.” One soldier recalled the smell and heat being
the most intense: “I caught a whiff of the jungles, something dead there. I was not
prepared for the heat and smell.”105 In Working-Class War, some of the American
soldiers’ first impressions of Vietnam, “describe an intense and shocking heat: ‘like
stepping into a sauna’ or ‘walking into a blast furnace’ –‘The sweat just popped.”106 Jim
Barret recalled that the country smelled like feces: “The first thing I noticed when we got
off the plane at Cam Ranh Bay was the smell. It smelled like –the whole country smelled
like—well, it smelled like shit. Like you just walked into a bathroom that hadn’t been
cleaned properly.” As a result U.S. troops began to feel “defiled and unclean,” and
possibly contributing to them seeing the whole war as “a contaminating experience.”107
These smells also contributed to how troops perceived the Vietnamese living in the
countryside as well. Due to the smell of the area, Ehrhart began to develop resentful
feelings for them and reflected “Jesus Christ, these people don’t even smell like human
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beings. And they were so little. So foreign.”108 Many American troops began to feel the
same way and grew resentful to the Vietnamese as American deaths began to pile up.
Even more so when the percentage of draftees increased (up to one-third of all troops in
Vietnam) among troops who never wanted to be in Vietnam in the first place as the
number of troops ballooned up to 536,000 in in 1968.109 Adding to the frustrations was
that many of the battles and skirmishes were on the Viet Cong and NVA’s terms, often
being in the “backyard” of the bases. According to a report from the U.S Joints Chiefs of
Staff, “three-fourths of the battles [in Vietnam] are at the enemy’s choice of time, place,
type, and durations.”110 As a result of the large amount of frustrations American troops
were feeling, the number of war time atrocities being reported skyrocketed.
It seemed as if all Vietnamese people were a target for the United States’ troops; a
running target who they could riddle with bullets and massacre at will. Instead of treating
the Vietnamese with dignity and respect as called for by the 1962 pocket guide, the
troops began to be pushy and forceful with the local inhabitants. For example, a 1969
article from the New York Times, reported that troops used brutal tactics to clear out a
village with one sergeant declaring it a “free fire zone” and referred to the villagers as
“dinks” as they fled from their burning homes. The same unit responsible for this action
destroyed more than a dozen villages in one week alone.111 Vietnamese refugee Nguyen
Van Tam stated that when U.S. troops entered his village, “They pointed to the road and
said we must all leave. My mother cried. They took matches and burned our house.
They then shot our buffaloes. Then we began to walk to the refugee camp outside Da
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Nang to find shelter and food.” As more and more villages and homes were being
destroyed by U.S. troops, increasing amounts of Vietnamese were forced to turn to
Saigon run-refugee camps for survival. An American aid worker recalled these camps
were “more like concentration camps than the attractive-sounding ‘return to village
programs’, as they are called by the Government. Conditions in these camps are
appalling.”112 The images of American troops burning down Vietnamese villagers’
homes were extremely popular and many believed that it was standard operating
procedure. In fact, Japanese journalist Katsuichi Honda was in shock when he did not
see troops setting fire to one of the houses when he accompanied a contingent of U.S.
soldiers: “One thing struck me as unusual. In spite of the 30% of the houses still left
unburnt, these American soldiers did not set fire to them. In all cases I had witnessed,
hamlets considered as belonging to liberated districts had been burnt down 100%,
without an exception.”113
Napalm Sticks to Kids
According to Nick Turse in his book Kill Anything that Moves, some units would
compete against each other for the higher body count, and it became common for
American troops to kill groups of civilians with their reasoning being that small groups of
civilians could be logged in with enemy deaths. Therefore, it became increasingly typical
for patrols to plant weapons on dead civilians in order to avoid questioning and adhere to
standard operating procedure.114 For United States troops, it appeared that Vietnam was
no longer a land of beauty and peace, but now a place where there were no rules or
morals; it was complete chaos and enemies were everywhere. In fact, the First Cavalry
112
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Division wrote a song which described this mentality showing the utter brutality
American troops were showing the Vietnamese:
We shoot the sick, the young, the lame,
We do our best to kill and maim,
Because the kills count all the same,
Napalm sticks to kids.
Ox cart rolling down the road,
Peasants with a heavy load,
They’re all VC when the bombs explode,
Napalm sticks to kids 115
War atrocities in Vietnam were a common occurrence; the boundaries of civilian and
enemy had been blurred, and as stated by the above song, all dead Vietnamese are Viet
Cong. The most notorious of these acts would be the My Lai Massacre, in which over
four hundred Vietnamese civilians were brutally slaughtered. Despite false reports being
filed in a major top down cover-up that lasted twenty months, the piles “of civilian bodies
with children clearly among them,” stood as a monument to the dehumanization and
brutal treatment of the Vietnamese.116 One U.S. officer felt that if civilians were killed, it
would send the communist forces a strong message, “So a few women and children get
killed…Teach ‘em a damned good lesson. They’re all V. C. or at least helping them …
you can’t convert them, only kill them.”117 This is a radical shift from the message
United States propaganda was saying about the Vietnamese and how American troops
were told to engage them. The United States told American soldiers the Vietnamese
were a people that needed saving from the North, and demanded dignity and respect. As
the land became decimated, the image and idea of a beautiful land and grateful people
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was shattered. Now the American combatant saw the Vietnamese civilian as treacherous,
untrustworthy, and beyond saving. There was no way to convert the Vietnamese in to a
modern people free of communism; death was the only answer for them.
A popular memory of the Vietnam War was the burning of Vietnamese villages
and mistreatment of the villagers. In Honda’s report, he noted that commanders of
battalions often commented that “Cameramen always take pictures highlighting only the
burning of the villages.” When interviewing an NBC-TV cameraman, he discovered that
the images and videos being broadcast in the United States were often grim, and showed
how “Villages were turned into hell wherever the American soldiers arrived” and often
led to Americans seeing their troops as being cruel and heartless:
Heavy tanks and APC tanks enter a hamlet, marching in columns. American
soldiers file out of the tanks and approach farmhouses. The inhabitants come out
of their shelters. All are women, children and old people. They plead with the
soldiers in a language which the latter did not understand. Brushing aside all their
entreaties, the soldiers set fire to the houses with their lighters…the houses which
have been completely dried up, are instantly tuned into pillars of fire. Wailing
women and children. An old man about to run into a flaming house, trying to
save what little he can. A housewife clinging to him in frantic efforts to keep him
from the danger.118

Videos and images similar to this were prevalent in the news and exposed the brutality of
the war, with many thinking the treatment of the Vietnamese was “too merciless.”119
These also showed how the Vietnamese, who were originally seen as innocent and with
respect, had now been treated as inhuman and without mercy.
When news and conditions of Vietnamese detainees reached the eyes and ears of
the public, the International Committee of the Red Cross began an investigation touring
sixty U.S. run detention facilities in 1968 and 1969. During these investigations, the Red
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Cross learned that captives were interrogated and tortured by U.S. servicemen before
being sent to South Vietnamese forces.120 The evidence found in the Red Cross
investigation uncovered various forms of torture that prisoners endured such as burnings,
beatings, and electrical shock.121 Mass paranoia and the “shoot first, ask questions later”
attitude being adopted by troops, involved children and youngsters. For example, a
twelve year old boy was killed by a member from the 82nd Airborne Division for going
through a bases’ dump site in the Hau Nghia Province. Other instances included a
shooting of a sixteen year old girl in the skull and the wounding of a ten year old boy
after soldiers from the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division fired their rifles and
grenade launchers to scare off a group of local youngsters in 1970.122 In 1971, Major
Gordon Livingston testified before Congress that “Above 90 percent of the Americans
with whom I had contact in Vietnam’ treated the Vietnamese as subhuman and with
‘nearly universal contempt.”123 Instead of being seen as the “rural” people who were in
need of political “mobilization,” the Vietnamese were now the man in the black pajamas,
who was deceptive and untrustworthy in a land filled with eerie jungles and sniper
bullets.124
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EPILOGUE: AN EERIE HEALING JUNGLE?
When the United States “lost” their former protégé China to communist influence,
American officials were going to stop at nothing to prevent their newest investment from
going “red” as well. After all, no president or politician in their right mind would want to
be remembered as the one who lost Vietnam. To lose Vietnam would forever have been
labeled as a failure and ruin a president’s legacy, just as the loss of China did to Truman’s
Presidency. Hence throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, massive monetary and
military advisory investments were put into South Vietnam. Because of this, the
American government saw South Vietnam as a modern nation on the rise and a perfect
example of what American aid could accomplish. When U.S. troops were required to go
to Vietnam, they felt the land was full of harmony and loveliness. They were stationed to
be at war in a tropical park reminiscent of Shangri- La. American soldiers were
respectful of Vietnamese farmers and back on the domestic front, the public supported
the government’s actions. United States troops felt the only signs of war present in
Vietnam were the technology and supplies that they had brought themselves.
The situation for U.S. troops in Vietnam was wearisome. They were stressed,
frustrated, and because of the draft, many were forced to be there. During the early
1960s, there was a period of mixed emotions towards the Vietnamese. Yet by the late
1960s and in to the 1970s, there feelings towards the Vietnamese were synonymous with
violence and loathing. Yet almost a decade after the United States had pulled out of
Vietnam in 1973, troops began to revisit what was once considered Shangri-La on earth
and re-establish friendships with the Vietnamese. In fact Vietnam veterans “constituted
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the largest population of U.S. citizens in Vietnam” during the 1980s.125 But why was
this? What could veterans hope to gain by going back to visit a country full of
untrustworthy and deceptive inhabitants? According to Bruce Prideaux’s article, “Echoes
of War: Battlefield Tourism,” while there are a wide variety of motives for people
wanting to visit sites of conflict, veterans’ are being brought on by a yearning “to
remember comrades; the rekindle memoires of loved ones who fell in battle; to ponder on
the feats of those who they will never know; and to gloat on victory or lament over
defeat.”126 Ria Dunkley argues that while each person has their own reasons for visiting
sites of conflict, an overwhelming majority of them have to do with educational purposes
or honoring the memories and service of their ancestors or those who fought for their
country. Dunkley further points out that tourism to these sites have has often been
compared to a “religiously uplifting” experience, and marketed as a pilgrimage rather
than an educational practice. However Dunkley argues that whether the purpose for
people visiting is education or remembrance, both are emotionally cathartic:
Both experiences can be emotionally cathartic and offer psychological healing
and a deepening and strengthening of faith. Motives for undertaking medieval
pilgrimage were varied and included healing or undertaking a journey as part of
penance, to achieve spiritual merit or to be associated with religious saints and
figures by gaining insights into their lives and deaths - all of which might have
resonance with contemporary battlefield tourists.127

Scholars have come to number of conclusions as to why sites of conflict have
attracted large numbers of visitors. Richard Sharpley argues that people may visit these
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landscapes in order to “to gain a sense of national identity or out of national pride” and
learn more about their cultural heritage.128 Other scholars such as V. L. Smith contend
that the majority of those visiting sites of conflict are actually researchers, or those
looking to broaden their knowledge of the conflict itself, rather than fulfilling a patriotic
call: “Battlefields are of particular interest to two diverse groups: history buffs and
military strategists, both real and armchair…For many visitors an eerie sense of the
supernatural lingers in the air – the mystery of the souls (or spirits) of those who died
there.” 129 Whatever the reasons are, there continues to be a fascination with sites of
conflict “despite the passage of time.”130 More and more, these sites have grown in
popularity and “today individuals can either visit independently using one of the many
guidebooks, or join an [organized] tour as there are a range of large and small
[organizations]” that offer fully planned trips to these places.131
Americans and Europeans have continually held a very high regard for sites of
conflict, treating them with a religious like reverence. According to scholar Douglas
Hurt, battlefields are “Often… the most valued and revered spaces of a culture, because
their widely shared significance outweighs competing values and potential uses of the
site.”132 In the United States, up until the incidents of September 11th 2001, the
battlefield at Gettysburg and the Oklahoma City Bombing Memorial may have been the
most sacred. These sites are highly politicized in the United States and often the subject
of much debate due to “Historic sites and battlefields [being] critical places for
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interpretation because they are symbols of federal authority on the American landscape
that often reinforce the legitimacy of past government action.” Hurt further argues that
“War memorials in particular are expressions of political memory that reflect what a
society wants to remember or, conversely, what it wants to forget.”133
Since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations under the Clinton
administration, Vietnam has become a hot tourist destination. According to the Christian
Science Monitor, Vietnam Battlefield Tours “estimates it has taken more than 1,000
veterans to the country since the group’s founding in 2005.” The Vietnamese
government estimates “that more than 400,000 Americans – many of them former
military – have visited the country annually” with some even ex-patriating to Vietnam.134
There has been a rise in the number of organizations who plan entire trips around visiting
sites of conflict in Vietnam, such as Back to the Nam and Vietnam Battlefield Tours.
However one of the biggest reasons why Vietnam has attracted such a large number of
veterans is because of how it is marketed. According to Christina Schewenkel’s The
American War in Contemporary Vietnam, “Travel to Vietnam is frequently marketed to
veterans as a healing journey, through which a transformed moral state is achieved.”135
Revisiting Vietnam provided veterans a chance to “reconcile with a painful and formative
past” as pilgrimages to former battle sites served “as a cathartic experiences that involves
apprehensive and yet performative engagements with memory.”136 The land of Vietnam,
which was remembered as laden with traps, death, and as a prison, had been replaced
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with new memories; memories of a healing environment, cathartic experiences, and
putting to rest demons from the war.
A friendship between those American veterans who have chosen to go back to
Vietnam and the Vietnamese that they meet has been established, and the land has once
again been seen in a romanticized view. Returning to Vietnam after the war has also
served as a means of therapy for battling Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Numerous
organizations such as Back to the Nam and Tours of Peace organize trips for veterans
interested in returning to Vietnam and often see it as a first step in battling PTSD.
Combat veteran Bill Braniff, founder of Back to the Nam, has travelled to Vietnam
numerous times, befriending former enemies “to soothe the emotional and physical
wounds of war.”137 On the organization’s website Bill writes that the landscape also
healed like the veterans: “Returning to Vietnam is more than a healing experience for
Veterans, it is a trip taking you around the countryside, visiting with former adversaries,
seeing the natural beauty of a land that was involved in war for probably over 2,000
years.”138 Tours of Peace advertises that while many cannot fathom why veterans would
desire returning to a land where so was so much death and bitter memories occurred, it
helps returning veterans find a sense of peace and closure: “[S]eeing Vietnam as it is
now, meeting people who survived the war, and those who grew up in the post war years,
gives veterans the opportunity to bring closure to their Vietnam war experience.”139
According to one veteran, revisiting Vietnam helped him take control of life:
Like many of my fellow veterans, I have suffered the effects of PTSD since
returning from Vietnam in 1970. In and out of therapy for 15 years, I finally
137
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accepted the fact that PTSD was destroying my life. I needed help, I needed to go
back to that place where it all began...Vietnam. The help I needed came in the
form of TOP Vietnam Veterans. This Veterans organization made it possible for
me to return to Vietnam, and in doing so, I was empowered to turn the page, and
get on with my life. I have come full circle. I am once again a whole person.140

Another veteran who participated in Tours of Peace claimed, “the old images of the war
are still with me, but have somewhat faded and are put into the past. Now when I think of
Vietnam, I have new images: smiling children, happy faces, a beautiful country, the
people are at peace. It makes my heart feel good.”141 Not only is this transformation
remarkable, but also supports Frederick Olmsted’s argument about the healing power of
nature. In Olmsted’s report, he claimed that it was
a scientific fact that the occasional contemplation of natural scenes of an
impressive character, particularly if this contemplation occurs in connection with
relief from ordinary care…is favorable to the health and vigor of men and
especially to the health and vigor of their intellect beyond any other conditions
which can be offered.142

This is a remarkable transformation in comparison to how combat troops had viewed the
Vietnamese in the later 1960s and early 1970s. Even family members of war veterans
have journeyed to Vietnam as a means of finding closure and healing for their personal
attachments to the war. Patty Randall, a widow of an American soldier who died in
Vietnam remarked after her visit, “It is a beautiful country, not the swampy, jungle over
grown shown in the movies. The people were very nice – every time they found out why
we were there – they would tell me ‘very sorry Madame.”143 Even interactions with the
Vietnamese veterans who fought on the opposing side have been cathartic. Wayne
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Karlin, coeditor of The Other Side of Heaven, returned to Vietnam in 1994. After a night
of heavy drinking on Christmas Eve, Karlin found himself finding support from the most
unlikely of sources during a flashback, including one Vietnamese man who had been
firing at him from the other side in Quang Tri:
I was fairly drunk. There were firecrackers going off all over the place. We’re in
this huge crowd. It’s very dark and I start feeling all these people pressing in on
me. I’m the only Westerner there. Running through my mind are these old
American POWs being marched through Hanoi during the war and crowds of
people screaming at them. I really start to lose it. Suddenly the guy from Quang
Tri and a vet on my other side just grab my arms and hold onto my hands. The
others from a protective circle around me. They can see what’s going on, they’ve
been in the war too…I was remembering a story one of them had told earlier
about being on an antiaircraft crew that shot down an American plane. Maybe
that’s why that POW image came to mind. He’d been in the party that went out in
a boat to pull the pilot out of the water when people in the area just wanted to kill
him. That’s what it felt like—like they were pulling me out of the water.144

While there are not any dates provided with these testimonials, it is astonishing to see
American troops perceiving Vietnam and the Vietnamese in such a positive light. .
Under the Clinton Administration, diplomatic relations reopened between the
United States and Vietnam in 1995. Vietnam became a top tourist destination as
students, scholars, tourists, and Vietnamese refugees who looked to visit their old home.
The “re-opening” of Vietnam became an opportunity for tourists to fulfil their desire to
“see, experience, and understand mass destruction and violence in the modern era.”145
While this looked like an excellent opportunity for veterans and their families, there are
still those who are not ready to return due to “complex historical, economic, and
psychological barriers.” There are those that still harbor hatred for the Vietnamese and
others who are not yet ready to revisit and lay their ghosts of Vietnam to rest. Schwenkel
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writes that one woman wished to visit Vietnam to aid a family member: “I have a cousin
who served in Vietnam and refuses to think about going back. He can’t even fathom it.
He has a deep dislike for the Vietnamese people.”146
As American veterans and those affected by the war have been able to find peace
in the lands of Vietnam, the Vietnamese countryside has been healing as well. While
much of southern Vietnam still remains contaminated by the different herbicides and
defoliants used, different organizations have lent their support to heal the landscape.
Project RENEW, Restoring the Environmental and Neutralizing the Effects of War, was
formed in 2001 and has dedicated themselves to humanitarian efforts for those affected
by the Vietnam War and the removal of unexploded ordnance such as rocket-propelled
grenades, mines, and artillery shells.147 As of 2012, the Obama administration has
“committed serious money to cleaning up the worst of the dioxin hot spots.”
Additionally, USAID, “is now set to disburse another $21 million in humanitarian aid for
people with serious birth defects and disabilities.”148 While it be a very long time, if
ever, before the Vietnamese landscape fully heals from the war, these are all steps in the
right directions.
Contributing to the Vietnamese landscape becoming one of healing and closure, is
troops having gone back to make sense of their involvement. There is a long tradition of
American veterans going on excursions to old battlefields, but Vietnam veterans do so for
a different reason. World War II veterans were hailed as heroes and honored with
parades when they arrived home. Vietnam veterans received no pomp and circumstance;
the popular memory is that they were spit upon, called baby killers, and looked down
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upon for serving in a war the public did not fully support.149 There was also no clear
objective in Vietnam other than preventing communist takeover. World War II soldiers
were deployed to put a stop to the Nazi war machine, and topple the Japanese Empire
which had attacked Pearl Harbor. In Korea, American troops joined the United Nations
in a police action to push back the aggressive North Korean forces and Chinese army.
The United States had also been victorious or achieved their objective in previous
conflicts; in this war the United States had been defeated. Additionally this was a long
drawn out conflict that by the end did not have popular support. The American public
had turned against the war and politicians were calling for an end to it. Most veterans’
pilgrimages to battle sites serve as a means of memorializing their sacrifices and
honoring those who gave their lives. While Vietnam veterans did so as well, they
returned to their battle-sites to combat PTSD, find closure, and make sense of a war that
remains controversial in American memory. After returning from his service 1967, Greg
Kleven recalled asking himself why the United States got involved in the first place: “I
kept asking myself, why did we go? What was behind it? I never knew the history of it.
So I was searching for all of those things.” Contributing to the lack of closure was the
lack of American media coverage following the fall of Saigon in 1975. This led to
veterans having a hard time “understanding how their role in the war contributed to the
country's well-being.”150 To this day, there are a significant number of American
veterans who have expatriated to Vietnam. Not only has revisiting old battlefield and
sites of conflict allowed people to pay homage to their ancestors and explore their
149
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national identity, but also allowed people to lay ghosts to rest and honor their fallen
comrades.
The Vietnam War was unlike any other war that the United States had
participated in throughout its existence. While the land of Vietnam has been engulfed in
a constant war for independence since the 1930s, the Americans brought a different type
of warfare with a new strategy: modernized warfare and decimating the land in order to
break the will of the enemy. The idea and assumption that superior technology and
battlefield tactics would be enough to contain the communist threat to the north could not
have been more wrong. The United States plunged themselves into a war that was seen
more of an obligation, and according to President Dwight E. Eisenhower, the situation in
Vietnam was “a dangerous mess.”151 Failure to commit to war would be seen cowardly
and embarrass the United States on the international scene is they would be seen as inept
and weak.
By destroying the land and jungles where communist forces were supposedly
hiding, the United States instead chose to focus the efforts of its superior firepower and
technology on breaking the will of the enemy. A land in which respect and honor was
supposed to be held in high regard was bombed indiscriminately, and Vietnamese
civilians were shot before being asked questions. In reexamining John Olson’s image of
the Tet Offensive, Figure 4, one can see how it perfectly captures what the Vietnam War
embodied. In the background, there is evidence of heavy vegetation that has been
devastated by constant bombing and fighting. Behind the troops there are remnants of
where one (or several) buildings once stood. All over the ground where they crouch,
151
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there are pieces of buildings, shell fragments, pieces of wood and ruined foliage. The
looks and dress of the troops themselves look to be worn and tired, just like the American
war effort. Furthermore, the skies are grey and seem to be darkened by the warfare
which is ravaging the land, almost as if foreshadowing future events and the eventual end
result of the Vietnam War.152 The Vietnamese lost all their respect and the positive
perception they were perceived as. Instead of being seen as the “rural” people who were
in need of political “mobilization,” they were now the man in the black pajamas, who
was deceptive and untrustworthy in a land filled with eerie jungles and sniper bullets. 153
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APPENDIX
FIGURES

Fig. 1: Soldiers Carry A Wounded Comrade Through A Swampy Area
Area,, 1969, National
Archives: Teaching With Documents: The War in Vietnam - A Story in Photographs,
ARC Identifier: 531457, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/vietnamhttp://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/vietnam
photos/images/wounded-comrade.gif
comrade.gif [Accessed May 1, 2014].
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Fig. 2: Larry Burrows,, Untitled
Untitled, Larry Burrows—Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images,
Vietnam October 1966, http://life.time.com/history/life
http://life.time.com/history/life-behind-the-picture
picture-larry-burrowsreaching-out-1966/#5 [Accessed March 20, 2014].
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Fig. 3: Larry Burrows, US soldiers on the ground in Vietnam in 1968
1968,, 1968,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/12/18/vietnam_and_victory/
[Accessed April 3, 2014].
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Fig 4: John Olson, Untitled
Untitled, Life 64, No. 10 (March 8 1968):
http://media.knoxnews.com/media/img/photos/2009/11/10/111109vietnamvet2e_t607.jpg
[Accessed April 3, 2014].
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